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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the
Supreme Court will consider whether Proposal 2, an amendment to
the Michigan Constitution banning race as a factor in state university
admissions, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
2
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Proposal
2 makes it unconstitutional in Michigan for democratically-elected
members of university governing boards to establish race-based
affirmative action admissions programs, but does not place a
3
corresponding burden on other admissions factors. The Sixth Circuit
4
analyzed Proposal 2 using the political process doctrine established
5
by the so-called “Hunter trilogy.” Under the political process
doctrine, a political structure that places “special burdens on the
ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation” must be

∗ J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law.
1. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th
Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct.
1633 (2013).
2. See id. at 473 (identifying the relevant issue as “whether Proposal 2 runs afoul of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection by removing the power of university officials to
even consider using race as a factor in university admissions decisions”).
3. Id. at 481–83.
4. Id. at 474–85 (applying the political process doctrine).
5. L. Darnell Weeden, Affirmative Action California Style—Proposition 209: The Right
Message While Avoiding a Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 281, 291 (1997). The “Hunter trilogy” consists of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969), Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), and Crawford v. Bd. of Educ.
of L.A., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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6

analyzed under strict scrutiny. Proposal 2 failed strict scrutiny
because Michigan did not provide a compelling interest for enacting
7
the Amendment. Thus, Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection
8
Clause.
Ambiguities in the political process doctrine create inconsistent
9
judicial application, especially when judges apply the political process
10
doctrine in affirmative action cases, as exemplified by Schuette. In
fact, the Sixth Circuit opinion relies on an inaccurate application of
affirmative action precedent because a valid affirmative action
11
program cannot violate the political process doctrine. Accordingly,
the Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit and distinguish Schuette by
holding that the political process doctrine does not apply when a
government restructuring effectively repeals affirmative action in
favor of race-neutral admissions policies. This holding would not
require formally overruling the political process doctrine and would
avoid the analytical problems that result due to the incompatibility
between the political process doctrine and the Court’s affirmative
12
action jurisprudence. After settling the political process question, the
Court should analyze Proposal 2 under a traditional Equal Protection

6. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 467.
7. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 488–89 (“[B]ecause the Attorney
General does not assert that Proposal 2 satisfies a compelling state interest, we need not
consider this argument.”).
8. Id. at 489 (“Therefore, those portions of Proposal 2 that affect Michigan’s public
institutions of higher education violate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
9. See Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 269–70 (1997) (discussing
problems with judicial application of the political process doctrine). Spann notes that ambiguity
in the political process doctrine creates the undesirable outcome of allowing judges to tailor
decisions based on their own personal views of affirmative action. Id.
10. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 493 (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection for the ultimate political authority to declare
a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far afield from the Supreme Court
precedents.”); but see id. at 485–86 (majority opinion) (holding that the political process
doctrine applies to both race-neutral and race-preference measures).
11. David Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action: Forgetting the
Narrative, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/02/
schuette-v-coalition-defend-affirmative-action-forgetting-narrative/. Bernstein notes that a valid
affirmative action policy must benefit the entire student body, not just minority students. Id.
However, the Sixth Circuit determined that Proposal 2 created political process concerns
because it invalidated affirmative action policies that provided benefits to minorities. Id. Thus,
the Sixth Circuit’s political process analysis cannot stand under a true reading of the Court’s
affirmative action jurisprudence. Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 22–23, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, No. 12–682 (U.S. June 24, 2013).
12. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a politicalrestructuring theory are incompatible.”).

D'ALESSIO 1.23.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/23/2014 9:01 AM

THE LIMITS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE

105

13

analysis, and hold that Proposal 2 is constitutional.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Proposal 2
14

Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger
15
opponents of affirmative action
and Grutter v. Bollinger,
spearheaded a movement to amend the Michigan Constitution to
16
invalidate affirmative action admissions policies. The initiative,
known as Proposal 2, earned a spot on Michigan’s November 2006
17
18
election ballot, and passed with 58 percent of the vote. Proposal 2
amended Article I of the Michigan Constitution to include provisions
stating:
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne
State University, and any other public college or university,
community college or school district shall not discriminate against,
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting.
(3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public
college, university, or community college, school district, or other
political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within

13. Id. at 14–16.
14. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
15. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
16. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 471
(6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S.
Ct. 1633 (2013).
17. Id. The Michigan Constitution restricts ballot access to initiatives that receive
signatures from ten percent of the total votes in the previous gubernatorial election. Operation
King’s Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2).
Proposal 2 received 508,202 signatures, but only needed 317,757. Id.
18. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 471. Notably, the Sixth Circuit
considered an appeal concerning whether Proposal 2 received enough signatures to gain
inclusion on the ballot by means of fraud, but dismissed the appeal as moot because Proposal 2
had already passed. Operation King’s Dream, 501 F.3d at 592.
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19

the State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1.

B. Procedural History: The District Court and Sixth Circuit Panel
Decision
Two plaintiffs groups filed suits in the Eastern District of
Michigan challenging the constitutionality of Proposal 2 as applied to
higher education: the Coalition plaintiffs, comprised of individuals
and opposition groups, and the Cantrell plaintiffs, a group of faculty
members and some prospective and current students at the University
20
of Michigan (collectively, the Respondents). The district court
consolidated the cases and granted Michigan’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding Proposal 2 did not violate the political process
21
doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the
doctrine did not prohibit “programs that give an advantage on the
22
basis of race as a remedy to combatting other social disadvantages.”
However, in a 2-1 panel decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed and
granted summary judgment for Respondents, holding that Proposal 2
23
violated the political process doctrine. Specifically, Proposal 2
“modifie[d] Michigan’s political process to place special burdens on
the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation,” but
was not alleged to fulfill a compelling state interest as required under
24
strict scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit granted Michigan’s subsequent
25
request for en banc review.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Protection Clause: Traditional Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny
26
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
19. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
20. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 472. The Coalition plaintiffs included
the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigration Rights and Fight for
Equality by Any Means Necessary. Id.
21. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 932, 960 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
22. Id. at 957.
23. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607,
631, 633 (6th Cir. 2011).
24. Id. at 631 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 473.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause . . . is the prevention of official conduct
27
discriminating on the basis of race.” Accordingly, all explicit racial
classifications, including benign racial classifications, receive strict
28
scrutiny review. To survive strict scrutiny, the law must be narrowly
29
tailored to fulfill a compelling government interest.
Facially neutral laws also receive strict scrutiny review if they have
a discriminatory impact on a racial minority and were passed for a
30
discriminatory purpose. The discriminatory purpose need not be
explicit and may “be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including . . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than
31
another.” However, the Court has clarified that to find a
discriminatory purpose the law must have been passed “‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
32
group.” Without both discriminatory impact and discriminatory
purpose, the law need only satisfy rational basis review, under which
the law survives an equal protection challenge if it can “rationally . . .
be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally
33
empowered to pursue.”
B. The Equal Protection Clause: Political Process Doctrine
1. The Hunter Trilogy: Introduction
The political process doctrine is a “less familiar and more nuanced
34
branch of equal protection doctrine.” It holds that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits “‘a political structure that treats all individuals
as equals,’ yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a
way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to

27. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
28. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
29. Id. at 235.
30. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239–42 (noting that “[d]isproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution” and that the Court’s “cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory impact”).
31. Id. at 242.
32. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
33. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 245–48 (applying only rational basis review even though
the race-neutral qualification test had a disproportionate impact on minorities, because the
Court found no evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose).
34. Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Burdens, and the
CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1024 (1996).
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35

achieve beneficial legislation.” Unlike traditional equal protection
analysis, which focuses on discriminatory intent, the political process
doctrine focuses on the discriminatory effect of government
36
restructuring. The doctrine is rooted in three cases known as the
37
38
“Hunter trilogy” : Hunter v. Erickson, Washington v. Seattle School
39
40
District, and Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education. Each
case in the Hunter trilogy adds a separate element to the doctrine, and
it is therefore worthwhile to consider each case in turn.
i. Hunter: The Foundation
In Hunter, the Court first established that a government
restructuring violates the Equal Protection Clause if it burdens
minority interests, and only minority interests, within the political
41
process. There, the Akron City Council passed a fair housing
ordinance designed to prevent racial discrimination in the real estate
42
market. Akron voters subsequently amended the city charter so that
any law regulating the real estate market based on racial
considerations had to receive a majority vote at a general election to
43
pass.
The Court held that the charter amendment violated the Equal
44
Protection Clause. It noted that although the amendment was
facially neutral, it primarily harmed racial minorities because
45
minorities would have benefitted from the fair housing ordinance.
Further, the majority vote requirement burdened future efforts by

35. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (quoting Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 84 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
36. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1035 (discussing “concern for effect rather
than intent” in the political process doctrine). Amar and Caminker point to evidence in the
Court’s Seattle School District opinion to refute the argument that the political process doctrine
is an implicit “soft intent” inquiry that allows the Court to find discriminatory intent when the
Court believes there is discriminatory intent, but lacks sufficient evidence to meet the
Washington v. Davis test. Id. at 1034–35. They also observe that although the political process
doctrine’s focus on effect differs from the traditional equal protection framework, it aligns the
political process doctrine with cases dealing with burdens imposed on the “exercise of political
rights such as voting and jury service.” Id. at 1035.
37. Weeden, supra note 5, at 291.
38. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
39. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
40. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
41. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1024.
42. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.
43. Id. at 387.
44. Id. at 393.
45. Id. at 390–91.
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minorities to secure laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the
housing market, but placed no corresponding burden on laws
forbidding discrimination based on other classifications, such as
46
political affiliation. Because the amendment targeted a law designed
to benefit racial minorities and restructured the political process to
discriminatorily burden minority interests, the Court applied strict
47
scrutiny. In the strict scrutiny inquiry, the Court noted that Akron
did not justify the amendment with a compelling government interest,
48
and therefore the amendment was unconstitutional.
ii. Seattle School District: Removing Authority to a Higher Level
of Government
In Seattle School District, the Court further developed the political
process doctrine by holding that a government restructuring creates a
discriminatory burden when it moves only the power to enact policies
benefitting racial minorities from a lower level of government to a
higher level of government. There, the Seattle School District adopted
the “Seattle Plan,” a mandatory busing system designed to remedy de
49
facto racial segregation in the local school system. In response,
Seattle residents passed Initiative 350, a state-wide policy which
forbid school boards from busing students to a school that was not
“geographically nearest or next nearest the student’s place of
50
residence.”
Relying on Hunter, the Court struck down Initiative 350 as a
51
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that
although Initiative 350 was facially neutral, it targeted busing to
remedy racial segregation, a program designed to benefit racial
52
minorities. Moreover, Initiative 350 reallocated the power to enact
racial busing policies from local government to state government, but
53
did not place a corresponding burden on busing for other purposes.
46. Id. at 391.
47. Id. at 391–93.
48. Id. Akron attempted to justify the amendment as a reflection of the public’s desire to
move slowly when forming policies impacting race relations. Id. at 392. Akron also argued that
the state has free reign to allocate legislative power. Id. Finally, Akron argued that because the
amendment passed through a referendum, it should be immune from judicial review. Id. The
Court rejected all these justifications. Id. at 392–93.
49. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460–61 (1982) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 461–62.
51. Id. at 470.
52. Id. at 471–74.
53. Id. at 474 (“The initiative removes the authority to address a racial problem—and only

D'ALESSIO 1.23.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

110

1/23/2014 9:01 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

Through this reallocation of power, Initiative 350 created a
discriminatory burden against minorities and therefore violated the
54
Equal Protection Clause.
iii. Crawford: Repealing Policies Designed to Benefit Racial
Minorities
In Crawford, the third and final case in the Hunter trilogy, the
Court held that the repeal of legislation benefitting racial minorities
55
does not violate the political process doctrine. There, California
voters passed Proposition I, an amendment to the California
Constitution that prohibited California courts from ordering racial
busing in situations in which a federal court would not have authority
56
to order busing. Prior to the passage of Proposition I, California
state courts had more expansive authority than federal courts when
57
ordering student busing to remedy public school segregation.
The Supreme Court analyzed Proposition I under the political
58
process doctrine and held that it was constitutional. The Court noted
that “the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as
59
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.” Thus,
having provided more expansive busing than that required by the
United States Constitution, California’s decision to curtail its busing
60
program so as to better align it with the federal criteria was valid.
However, the Court noted that a repeal coupled with a burden on
future minority efforts to achieve beneficial legislation, such as the
majority vote requirement in Hunter, would violate the political
61
process doctrine.

a racial problem—from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority
interests.”).
54. Id. at 483–84, 486–87.
55. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982).
56. Id. at 531–32.
57. Id. at 535.
58. Id. at 540–42.
59. Id. at 539.
60. Id. at 542.
61. Id. at 540–42.
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2. Coalition for Economic Equity
In 1997, the Ninth Circuit decided Coalition for Economic Equity
62
v. Wilson, a case with facts virtually identical to those in Schuette. In
Wilson, California voters passed Proposition 209, an amendment to
the California Constitution that forbid race-based discrimination and
preferential treatment in public employment, public education, and
63
public contracting. In the ensuing challenge, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Proposition 209 did not violate the Equal Protection
64
Clause under a traditional analysis. The court also held Proposal 2
did not trigger political process concerns because the political process
doctrine did not apply to the repeal of race-preference policies, like
65
affirmative action. The court characterized Proposition 209 as race
neutral because, by prohibiting racial discrimination, it prevented
minorities from achieving preferential treatment through affirmative
66
action. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Hunter and Seattle, noting
that those cases concerned burdens on enacting policies designed to
remedy racial discrimination, whereas Proposition 209 repealed race67
preference policies to create a baseline of racial neutrality.
3. The Test
68
The political process doctrine creates a two-part inquiry. If both
prongs are satisfied, strict scrutiny applies, meaning the law must be
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest to survive an
69
equal protection challenge. In the first prong, a court considers
62. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 696.
64. Id. at 702.
65. See id. at 709 (referring to application of the political process doctrine as an
“erroneous legal premise”).
66. See id. at 708 (“Plaintiffs challenge Proposition 209 not as an impediment to protection
against unequal treatment but as an impediment to receiving preferential treatment. The
controlling words, we must remember, are ‘equal’ and ‘protection.’ Impediments to preferential
treatment do not deny equal protection.”).
67. Id. at 706–07.
68. Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1022. The Sixth Circuit majority opinion in
Schuette follows a nearly identical two-part inquiry. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v.
Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that Hunter and Seattle
held that the political process doctrine applies when the government action “(1) has a racial
focus, targeting a policy or program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority,’” and
(2) “reorders the decisionmaking process in a way that places special burdens on a minority
group’s ability to achieve its goals through that process”), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v.
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
69. Amar & Caminker, supra note 34, at 1055 (advocating application of strict scrutiny to
California’s Proposition 209 because it fulfills the racial character and discriminatory burden
prongs).
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whether the law is “racial in character,” meaning it both “regulates a
racial subject matter” and “regulates the subject matter to the
70
detriment of the racial minority.” The Supreme Court has held this
prong can be satisfied through laws that have “textual references to
race,” laws that exclusively impact “racial matters,” and laws that have
71
a negative impact on “the interests of minorities.”
In the second prong, a court considers whether the governmental
restructuring places an asymmetric burden on the ability of minority
72
groups to advocate for legislation. This means the restructuring
burdens minority interests, but does not place a corresponding burden
73
on non-minority interests. For instance, in Hunter, the Court noted
the amendment subjected only legislation prohibiting racial
discrimination to a majority vote, but placed no corresponding burden
on legislation prohibiting discrimination based on other factors, such
74
as political affiliation. On the other hand, the repeal of legislation
beneficial to minorities, absent the imposition of a burden on future
efforts to secure beneficial legislation, does not create a
75
discriminatory burden, and thus fails the second prong.
C. The Court’s Limits on Affirmative Action
The Supreme Court has set out a well-defined roadmap for
establishing valid affirmative action admissions policies. Affirmative
action policies at state universities must pass strict scrutiny because
76
they explicitly classify applicants along racial lines. Thus, these
programs must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest. A valid affirmative action program furthers the
compelling government interest in achieving holistic diversity in
77
higher education. Diversity in this context benefits all students,
regardless of race, by breaking down stereotypes and by preparing

70. Id. at 1029 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 1030–32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Hunter, Seattle, and
Crawford).
72. Id. at 1041.
73. Id. at 1042–43.
74. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
75. Amar and Caminker, supra note 34, at 1044 (discussing Crawford’s holding that repeal
does not trigger strict scrutiny as “consistent with . . . the central message of Hunter-Seattle”).
76. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (holding that both the district court
and the court of appeals conducted improper strict scrutiny analyses of the University’s
admissions program by granting too much deference to the University); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003).
77. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30.
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students to enter a diverse workforce. Holistic diversity often
encompasses race, but only as a single element among others, such as
79
regional identity. Yet, the narrow tailoring prong forbids the use of
80
explicit racial quotas. To satisfy the narrow tailoring prong, the
admissions policy must treat race as a single, non-dispositive factor,
81
within the context of individual review.
IV. HOLDING
82

In an en banc decision, the Sixth Circuit held 8-7 that Proposal 2
83
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court began by noting that the case did not present a “second bite
84
at Gratz and Grutter” and thus it refused to consider the
85
constitutionality of affirmative action policies as a general matter.
Rather, the court considered Respondents’ claim that Proposal 2 is
unconstitutional under both traditional and political process equal
86
protection analyses.
The court applied the political process doctrine in a two-step
87
inquiry. First, it considered whether Proposal 2 targeted a program
that specifically benefitted a racial minority—in other words, whether
88
a racial minority could consider the policy to be in its interest.
Accordingly, because minorities lobbied for the implementation of
78. Id. at 330–33 (discussing benefits of holistic diversity).
79. See id. at 333 (“Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own, unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still
matters.”).
80. Id. at 334.
81. Id.
82. The 8-7 vote broke entirely along party lines, with the eight judges in the majority
nominated by Democratic presidents and the seven judges in the minority nominated by
Republican presidents. However, one judge in the majority was first nominated by President
Clinton and later renominated by President Bush as part of a compromise. Adam Liptak,
‘Politicians in Robes’? Not Exactly But..., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/27/us/judges-rulings-follow-partisan-lines.html?_r=0.
83. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470
(6th Cir. 2012) (“The existence of such a comparative structural burden undermines the Equal
Protection Clause’s guarantee . . . . We therefore . . . find Proposal 2 unconstitutional.”), cert.
granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
84. Id. at 473.
85. Id. (“[W]e are neither required nor inclined to weigh in on the constitutional status or
relative merits of race-conscious admissions policies as such.”).
86. See id. (noting that both the Coalition and the Cantrell plaintiffs challenged Proposal 2
under a political process analysis, but only the Coalition plaintiffs raised a traditional equal
protection challenge).
87. Id. at 477.
88. Id. at 478.
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affirmative action policies, Proposal 2 satisfied this prong.
For the second prong, the court considered whether Proposal 2
altered the political structure in a way that placed a special burden on
90
racial minorities’ ability to participate in the political process. This
91
entailed two considerations. First, the court determined that because
Michigan voters elected the board members at Michigan’s state
universities, and the board members have the authority to determine
admissions policies, affirmative action policies are a political
92
decision. Second, the court noted that Proposal 2 forces racial
minorities to seek a constitutional amendment in order to secure
93
future affirmative action policies. Lobbying board members for the
implementation of affirmative action policies would be ineffective
because under Proposal 2 board members are prohibited from
94
enacting such policies. However, groups favoring the inclusion of
other admissions factors, such as alumni connections, can still
95
effectively lobby board members. Thus, Proposal 2 imposes a
96
discriminatory burden on minorities alone.
Accordingly, the court applied strict scrutiny and found Proposal 2
97
failed because Michigan did not present a compelling state interest.
Because Proposal 2 violated the political process doctrine, the court
declined to evaluate Proposal 2 under a traditional Equal Protection
98
Clause analysis.
99
The dissenting judges filed five separate opinions. All of the
dissenters argued, to some degree, that because Proposal 2 only
repeals affirmative action, a race-preference policy, in favor of race100
neutral admissions policies, it should not be held unconstitutional.

89. Id. at 478–79.
90. Id. at 480.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 480–83.
93. Id. at 484.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 484–85.
96. Id. at 485.
97. Id. at 488–89 (noting that “because the Attorney General does not assert that Proposal
2 satisfies a compelling state interest, we need not consider this argument”).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 470.
100. Id. at 493 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection for
the ultimate political authority to declare a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far
afield from the Supreme Court precedents.”); id. at 511–12 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (“The postCivil War amendment that guarantees equal protection to persons of all races has now been
construed as barring a state from prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race.”); id. at 498
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Judge Griffin took this argument a step further, arguing that the
political process doctrine conflicts with mainstream equal protection
101
jurisprudence by eliminating the inquiry into discriminatory intent.
Accordingly, the political process doctrine operates as “an aberration
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment” and should be
102
invalidated. Judges Gibbons and Sutton noted that affirmative
action policies are not constitutionally required because they deviate
103
from the constitutional norm of non-discrimination. Thus, Michigan
should be free to effectively repeal affirmative action policies and
104
Finally, Judge Rogers
adopt race-neutral admissions policies.
observed that the court’s holding made it impossible for a state with
105
local governments to pass an anti-discrimination law.
Michigan appealed, and the Supreme Court granted its petition
for writ of certiorari to consider whether a state violates the Equal
Protection Clause by amending its constitution to prohibit race- and
sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in public106
university admissions decisions.

(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“[E]qual treatment is the baseline rule embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause, from which racial-preference programs are a departure.”); id. at 505 (Rogers,
J., dissenting) (joining Judge Gibbons’s dissent); id. at 505 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (joining Judge
Gibbons’s dissent).
101. Id. at 512–13 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting that in Hunter and Seattle “the Supreme
Court held that strict scrutiny applied without any need for the respective plaintiffs to show that
the laws were enacted as a result of discriminatory intent or were inexplicable on grounds other
than race”).
102. Id. at 512 (discussing the need to invalidate the political process doctrine).
103. Id. at 494 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (referring to “absence of any precedent suggesting
that states must employ racial preferences in university admissions”); id. at 506 (Sutton, J.,
dissenting) (“If racial preferences are only occasionally and barely constitutional, it cannot be
the case that they are always required.”).
104. Id. at 494 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (“Although it has convinced a majority of this court,
plaintiffs’ argument must be understood for the marked departure it represents—for the first
time, the presumptively invalid policy of racial and gender preference has been judicially
entrenched as beyond the political process.”); id. at 506 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (“A first premise
for resolving this case is, and must be, that a State does not deny equal treatment by mandating
it.”).
105. Id. at 505 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority opinion, it is hard to see how
any level of state government that has a subordinate level can pass a no-race-preference
regulation, ordinance, or law.”).
106. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at i, No. 12-682 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2012).
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V. ARGUMENTS
A. Arguments for Petitioner
1. Affirmative Action Jurisprudence
Petitioner argues that the Sixth Circuit decision is inconsistent
107
with the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. The
Sixth Circuit concluded that Proposal 2 repealed affirmative action
programs that benefited minorities, thereby satisfying the first prong
108
of the political process analysis. However, Petitioner notes that the
only compelling government interest that justifies affirmative action
109
programs is holistic diversity benefitting all students. A valid
affirmative action program cannot primarily benefit minority
110
111
students. Thus, the majority finds itself in a bind. By holding that
Michigan’s affirmative action policies benefit minorities, the Sixth
Circuit’s decision runs afoul of the Court’s affirmative action
112
precedent. Conversely, the court cannot conclude that Michigan’s
affirmative action policies fulfill the compelling interest in holistic
diversity because the first prong of the political process test requires
113
that the policy in question specifically benefit minorities. Such a
holding would push Proposal 2 outside the scope of the political
114
process doctrine. Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion illustrates the
incompatibility between the political process doctrine and the Court’s
115
affirmative action jurisprudence.
2. Policy Consequences
Petitioner also contends that the Sixth Circuit’s application of the
political process doctrine calls into question the constitutionality of
116
anti-discrimination laws. For instance, the Fair Housing Act of 1968
prohibits racial discrimination in the real estate market and preempts
117
state laws granting preferential treatment based on race. In effect,

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 22–23.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“A Grutter plan and a political-restructuring theory are incompatible.”).
Id.
Id.
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the Fair Housing Act restructures the political process, moving antidiscrimination policies in real estate from the local level to the federal
118
level. Consequently, minorities can no longer effectively lobby local
or state governments for legislation that would grant them special
119
consideration in the real estate market. Thus, Petitioner concludes
that the Fair Housing Act, and other anti-discrimination legislation,
could be invalidated on political process grounds, a far-reaching
implication that Petitioner concludes is inconsistent with the rationale
120
behind Hunter and Seattle School District.
3. Proposal 2 is Distinguishable from Hunter and Seattle School
District
Petitioner asserts that Proposal 2 is distinguishable from both
121
Hunter and Seattle School District. Proposal 2 eliminates affirmative
122
action policies that grant minorities special consideration.
Conversely, the amendment in Hunter eliminated an antidiscrimination policy and burdened future attempts to reach racial
123
neutrality. Further, Seattle School District is distinguishable because
Initiative 350 repealed a busing plan designed to remedy de facto
124
racial segregation. Thus, unlike Proposal 2, the busing system was
125
anti-discriminatory, not preferential.
B. Arguments for Respondents
1. The Sixth Circuit Properly Applied Precedent
Respondents argue that the Sixth Circuit decision should be
upheld as a faithful application of the political process doctrine set
126
forth in Hunter and Seattle School District. Prior to Proposal 2, all
groups could lobby for special consideration in the admissions
127
process. Accordingly, minorities advocated for affirmative action, a
constitutional means of ameliorating the impact of past racial

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id. at 20.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 18–19.
125. Id.
126. See Coalition Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 30, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, No. 12–682 (U.S. Aug. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Coalition Brief].
127. Id. at 38.
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128

discrimination. Moreover, Respondents note that racial minorities
are just one of many groups, including children of alumni and athletes,
129
that receive preferential treatment in the admissions process.
However, by making affirmative action illegal, Proposal 2 deprives
minorities, and only minorities, of the ability to advocate for
130
preferential treatment. This creates a discriminatory burden in the
same manner as did the situations in Hunter and Seattle School
131
District. Because Proposal 2 singles out minorities for this special
burden, it violates the Equal Protection Clause under a political
132
process analysis.
2. Refuting the Fair Housing Act Hypothetical
Respondents refute Petitioner’s argument that the political
process doctrine could invalidate antidiscrimination legislation, like
133
the Fair Housing Act. Respondents note that federal law preempts
state law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, so long as Congress acts in an area of enumerated
134
authority. Therefore, the Constitution requires that in certain
circumstances the “locus of decisionmaking” move from the state or
135
local level to the federal level. Accordingly, our federal system
envisioned that federal legislation, like the Fair Housing Act, would
136
preempt conflicting state laws. Thus, the political process doctrine
cannot require the invalidation of federal antidiscrimination
legislation, like the Fair Housing Act, because doing so would be
137
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause.

128. Id.
129. Id. at 37.
130. Id. at 38.
131. Id. at 30–31.
132. Id. at 38.
133. Brief for Respondents Chase Cantrell, et al. at 44, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, No. 12–682 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Cantrell Brief].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit decision. The
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence and the political process
doctrine are incompatible because a valid affirmative action program
138
cannot violate the political process doctrine. Further, ambiguity in
the political process doctrine provides judges too much leeway to
apply their own views of affirmative action, resulting in inconsistent
opinions. To combat these problems, the Court should hold that the
political process doctrine does not apply when a government
restructuring effectively repeals affirmative action programs in favor
of race-neutral admissions policies. The Court should consider
Proposal 2 under a traditional equal protection analysis and find it
139
constitutional.
A. Problems with the Political Process Doctrine
The political process doctrine fails to resolve the baseline question
140
of whether race-neutral policies implicate political process concerns.
Professor Spann argues that this ambiguity allows judges to exploit
their own personal opinion of affirmative action when applying the
141
political process doctrine in affirmative action cases. For instance,
the Ninth Circuit’s Wilson opinion characterizes Proposition 209 as
142
race neutral because it prohibits racial discrimination. But this
holding only follows if one disregards the residual impacts of past
racial discrimination. Conversely, the Wilson district court
characterized Proposition 209 as a race-based classification, adopting
143
a baseline that considers the effects of past discrimination. The
problem is that Proposition 209 can be characterized as either
discriminatory or neutral, depending on whether or not the judge
138. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a political-restructuring
theory are incompatible.”); Bernstein, supra note 11.
139. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14–16.
140. See Spann, supra note 9, at 269–70 (“[E]qual protection doctrine itself is simply too
indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by Proposition 209.”).
141. Id. at 270 (“It seems that a judge’s only choice is to fall back on his own political
preferences in order to give the Equal Protection Clause operative meaning.”).
142. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A state law
that prohibits classifications based on race or gender is a law that addresses in a neutral-fashion
race-related and gender-related matters.”).
143. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1505 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(“Because the Court finds . . . that Proposition 209 singles out an issue of special concern to
minorities and women—race- and gender-conscious affirmative action—and alters the political
process solely with respect to this issue, it concludes that the initiative plainly rests on
distinctions based on race.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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144

adopts a baseline that considers past racial discrimination. However,
145
the doctrine does not establish a baseline. This allows judges to use
the ambiguity in the discriminatory-neutral distinction as a proxy to
substitute their own preferences regarding affirmative action, which
creates divergent opinions.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Schuette highlight this
ambiguity. For instance, Judge Boggs’s dissent argues that the political
process doctrine should not apply because Proposal 2 creates raceneutral admissions programs and only burdens minorities’ efforts to
146
receive preferential treatment. Conversely, the majority holds that
the political process doctrine applies to Proposal 2 because Hunter
and Seattle School District establish that courts should apply the
political process doctrine for both race-neutral and race-preference
147
policies. Schuette thus presents another example of how ambiguity
in the political process doctrine creates inconsistent judicial
application.
B. The Political Process Doctrine Clashes with Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence and the political
148
process doctrine are completely incompatible. If, as the Sixth Circuit
holds, state university affirmative action programs are designed to
benefit minorities, then the affirmative action programs are
unconstitutional because holistic diversity benefitting all students is
the only compelling interest that can justify race-conscious admissions
149
policies. However, if the affirmative action programs do not benefit
minorities in particular, then the affirmative action programs cannot
satisfy the political process doctrine, which requires that the policy in

144. See Spann, supra note 9, at 261.
145. See id. at 269–70 (“The reason that neither the district court nor the court of appeals
was able to articulate a doctrinally satisfying justification . . . is that equal protection doctrine
itself is simply too indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by
Proposition 209.”).
146. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 493
(6th Cir. 2012) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection for the
ultimate political authority to declare a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far afield
from the Supreme Court precedents.”), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
147. Id. at 485–86.
148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a political-restructuring
theory are incompatible.”); Bernstein, supra note 11.
149. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 22–23.
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150

question specifically benefit minorities. Thus, a valid affirmative
151
action program cannot violate the political process doctrine.
Because the Sixth Circuit majority opinion relies on an inaccurate
reading of the Court’s affirmative action precedent, the decision must
152
be overturned.
Tellingly, neither Hunter nor Seattle School District, the doctrinal
bases for the Sixth Circuit’s decision, involve an affirmative action
153
program. In fact, Seattle School District suggests that the political
154
process doctrine was never meant to apply to affirmative action. In
a footnote, Justice Powell’s dissent emphasizes that the logical
extension of the Seattle School District decision is that “if the
admissions committee of a state law school developed an affirmativeaction plan that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene unless that
155
authority traditionally dictated admissions policies.” The Seattle
School District majority considered Powell’s point, but ultimately
concluded it was inapplicable because university admissions policies
156
were not related to minority participation in government. Thus, it
seems as though the Seattle School District Court never intended its
decision to apply to a situation involving the effective repeal of an
157
affirmative action program as with Proposal 2.
C. Proposal 2 Survives Traditional Equal Protection Analysis
To overcome these problems, the Supreme Court should hold that
the political process doctrine does not apply to the effective repeal of
affirmative action programs in favor of race-neutral admissions
policies. Here, like the busing remedy in Crawford, Michigan’s state
universities adopted affirmative action, a policy that is not
158
constitutionally required.
By eliminating affirmative action,
150. Id. at 23.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Emily Bazelon, The Michigan Experiment: The Affirmative Action Case Liberals
Deserve to Lose, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/new_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/supreme_court_s_michigan_affirmative_action_case_liberals_des
erve_to_lose.html?wpisrc=burger_bar.
154. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 19 (“So even the Seattle School District
majority did not view the opinion as controlling the outcome in a case like this one.”).
155. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 498 n.14 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
156. Id. at 480 n.23 (majority opinion).
157. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 19.
158. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466,
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159

Proposal 2 merely creates race-neutral admissions policies. In effect,
Proposal 2 repeals affirmative action policies, thus bringing it within
160
the scope of the Crawford decision.
With the political process question settled, the Court should find
Proposal 2 constitutional under a traditional equal protection
161
analysis. Under a traditional equal protection analysis, legislation
162
that classifies individuals along racial lines receives strict scrutiny.
163
However, Proposal 2 does not classify along racial lines. In fact, it
forbids the use of racial classifications in the college admissions
164
process.
The next inquiry under the traditional Equal Protection Clause
analysis is whether Proposal 2 has a discriminatory impact and
165
discriminatory purpose. The Court should find that Proposal 2 has a
discriminatory impact because it deprives minorities of the special
166
consideration they receive under affirmative action. However,
167
Proposal 2 did not pass because of a discriminatory purpose. Voters
may have considered a host of non-discriminatory factors when
voting on Proposal 2 and therefore it is not possible to say Proposal 2
168
passed due to a discriminatory purpose. Absent a discriminatory

511 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dissenting) (“If racial preferences are only occasionally and
barely constitutional, it cannot be the case that they are always required.”), cert. granted sub
nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
159. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14.
160. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 511 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (noting that
a repeal, similar to that in Crawford, is “all that happened here”).
161. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14–16.
162. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (holding that even benign
racial classifications receive strict scrutiny).
163. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 14.
164. Id.
165. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (“Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution.”). The Court also noted that “our cases have not embraced the proposition that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose,
is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially discriminatory impact.” Id.
166. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 1997). The Supreme
Court will likely agree with the Ninth Circuit’s Wilson opinion and hold that “Proposition 209
burdens members of insular minorities . . . who otherwise would seek to obtain race-based and
gender-based preferential treatment from local entities.” See id.
167. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 15–16 (endorsing the district court’s finding
that there are alternative justifications for supporting Proposal 2 other than racial animus and
neither Proposal 2’s ballot history, nor the public arguments in support of its passage suggest
discriminatory purpose).
168. See id. The district court lists a series of non-discriminatory motivations that
proponents of Proposal 2 may have based their decision upon, including: a belief that
affirmative action policies actually harm minorities, self-interest in receiving acceptance to a
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purpose, Proposal 2 must only survive rational basis review.
Proposal 2 can satisfy rational basis review because it “[i]t was not
irrational for a majority of Michigan’s voters to end race- and sex170
conscious admissions policies.”
V. CONCLUSION

Schuette presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify
ambiguity in the political process doctrine and avoid the doctrinal
problems that arise when courts apply the political process doctrine in
171
an affirmative action case.
The political process doctrine is
ambiguous on whether the repeal of a race-preference program in
favor of a race-neutral program implicates political process
172
concerns. This ambiguity allows judges to inject their own view of
affirmative action into the inquiry, creating widely divergent
173
opinions, a trend illustrated by the Sixth Circuit majority and
174
dissenting opinions. Further, applying the political process doctrine
in an affirmative action case creates a catch-22 where a court cannot
find that a valid affirmative action program satisfies the two-part
175
political process test. The Sixth Circuit opinion relies on this
176
improper analysis.
Therefore, the Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit and
distinguish Schuette by holding that the political process doctrine does
not apply to the effective repeal of affirmative programs in favor of

state university, a belief that affirmative action perpetuates stereotypes, and a preference for
implementation of affirmative action programs based on socio-economic factors. Id.
169. Id. at 16.
170. See id. (noting that Proposal 2 can likely survive rational basis review).
171. See Spann, supra note 9, at 269–70 (discussing problems inherent in applying the
political process doctrine).
172. See id. (“The reason that neither the district court nor the court of appeals was able to
articulate a doctrinally satisfying justification . . . is that equal protection doctrine itself is simply
too indeterminate to produce a resolution of the constitutional issues raised by Proposition
209.”).
173. See id. at 270 (“It seems that a judge’s only choice is to fall back on his own political
preferences in order to give the Equal Protection Clause operative meaning.”).
174. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466,
493 (6th Cir. 2012) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (“[H]olding it to be a violation of equal protection
for the ultimate political authority to declare a uniform policy of non-discrimination is vastly far
afield from the Supreme Court precedents.”), cert. granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013); but see id. at 485–86 (majority opinion) (holding that
the political process doctrine applies to both race-neutral and race-preference measures).
175. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 23 (“A Grutter plan and a politicalrestructuring theory are incompatible.”).
176. Id. at 22–23.
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race-neutral admissions policies. The Court should find Proposal 2
constitutional under a traditional equal protection analysis because
there is insufficient evidence for the Court to find that Proposal 2
passed with a discriminatory intent, a requirement for an equal
177
protection violation under the traditional analysis.

177. Id. at 14–16.

